Taiwan Today

Logic has played no great role in Chinese philosophy. Only one work of logic survives from the classical period. A mere seven were listed in a bibliography compiled about 2,000 years ago. Nor is Chinese systematic logic really logical except in a broad sense. The Chinese call philosophical logic Ming-chia or the School of Names (Semantics).

Nevertheless, the examples of logic that have survived are original and interesting, even baffling. The logicians are clearly related to the mystic Taoists.

Little is known of the two who are considered most representative. Hui Shih (about 380-300 B.C.) was a minister in one of the feudal states and the author of a code of laws. His work of logic was lost but ten of his paradoxes have survived in the Chuang Tzu. Hui Shih was, in fact, a friend of Chuang Tzu, the second of the great Taoists. They criticized each other's work. The other logician was Kung-sun Lung (about 320 250 B.C.), a scholar and teacher who lived under the patronage of several feudal rulers. He was interested in dialectic as well as logic. Both Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung were pacifists and advocates of disarmament.

These are the Paradoxes of Hui Shih taken from the Chuang Tzu:

1. The greatest thing has nothing beyond itself; this is called the infinite. The smallest thing has nothing within itself; this is called the infinitesimal. (Western cosmologists haven't done much better.)

2. That which has no thickness cannot be increased in thickness; yet in extent it may cover a thousand li.

3. The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes.

4. The sun at noon is the sun declining. The creature born is the creature dying.

5. A great similarity differs from a little similarity; they are called the lesser similarities and differences. All things are similar and yet all are different; these are called the greater similarities and differences.

6. The South has no limit and has a limit.

7. I go to Yueh today and arrived there yesterday.

8. Linked rings can be detached.

9. I know the center of the world; it is north of Yen (the northernmost state) and south of Yueh (the southernmost state).

10. Love all things equally, for the heavens and the earth are one composite body.

More Paradoxes

These are selections from Hui Shih's Debaters, also taken from the Chuang Tzu:

1. The egg has feathers.
2. A chicken has three legs.
3. Ying (the capital of Ch'u) contains the whole world.
4. A dog can be a sheep.
5. The horse lays eggs.
6. The frog has a tail.
7. Fire is not hot.
8. Mountains have mouths.
9. The wheel never touches the ground.
10. The eye does not see.
11. Attributes never reach; the reaching never comes to an end.
12. The tortoise is longer than the snake.
13. T-squares are not right-angled, and compasses cannot make circles.
14. Chisels do not surround their handles.
15. The shadow of a flying bird never moves.
16. There are moments when a flying arrow is neither in motion nor at rest. (This has Western counterparts.)
17. A puppy is not a dog.
18. A bay horse and a sun cow make three.
19. A white dog is black.
20. An orphan colt has never had a mother.
21. Take a rod one foot long and cut it in half every day, and it will still have something left even after ten thousand generations.

The Kung-sun Lung Tzu is brief but not easy to understand. The three passages to be quoted here are the best known. Pare of the content has defied elucidation through the centuries. Obviously there is a logical genius at work here. This is a fact that makes it strange that logic virtually disappeared from subsequent Chinese philosophy.

These are selections from the Kung-sun Lung Tzu:

Chapter 2. Discourse on the White Horse

Q. A white horse is not a horse—is this possible?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. "Horse" denotes form. "White" denotes color. What denotes color does not denote form. Therefore it is said, a white horse is not a horse.

Q. There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, then why is it not a horse? Since there is a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse. How can "white" deny the existence of "horse"?

Is There a Horse?

A. When a horse is wanted, yellow and black ones may all be brought. But when a white horse is wanted, yellow and black ones may not be brought. If a white horse were a horse, then what is wanted in the two instances would be the same. If what is wanted were the same, then a white horse would be no different from a horse. If what is wanted were not different, then why is that yellow and black horses are satisfactory in the one case but not in the other? What is satisfied and what is in the one case but not in the other? What is satisfied and what is not satisfied evidently are not the same. Now the yellow and black horses remain the same, and yet they will do for a horse, but not for a white horse. Hence it should be clear that a white horse is not a horse.

Q. If a horse with color is considered not a horse, then there will be no horses on earth, as there are no colorless horses on earth. Is this possible?

A. Horses, of course, have color. Therefore there are white horses. If horses had no color, there would be merely horses. How could we specify white horses? But a white horse is not a horse. A white horse is horse united with whiteness, or whiteness united with horse. Therefore, it is said, a white horse is not a horse.

Q. Horse not united with whiteness is horse; whiteness not united with horse is whiteness, as you say. But when horse and whiteness are united, the compound named white horse is applied, which means that they are united. It is not right to refer to them as though they were not united. Therefore it is not right to say that a horse is not a horse.

Counter Q. If you should regard a white horse as being a horse, you might as well claim a white horse to be a yellow horse. Would this be possible?

A. No. To hold that a horse is different from a yellow horse is to differentiate a yellow horse from a horse. To differentiate a yellow horse from a horse is to regard a yellow horse as not a horse. Now to regard a yellow horse as not a horse and yet to hold that a white horse is a horse would be like saying that birds fly in lakes or inner and outer coffins are kept in separate places. This would be the most perverse talk and confused argument in the world.

Q. A white horse cannot be said to be no horse, and this is the basis of separating whiteness. Even if it is not separated, still a white horse cannot be said to be no horse. The reason for holding it to be a horse is simply that a horse is invariably a horse, and not that a white horse is another kind of horse. Therefore when we hold that it is a horse, that is not to say that there is one kind of horse and another kind of horse.

A. A whiteness that does not fix itself upon any object may simply be overlooked. But in speaking of the white horse, we refer to a whiteness that is fixed upon its object. Whiteness that is fixed upon an object is not just whiteness as such. The term "horse" does not involve any choice of color. Therefore yellow and black ones all will do. The term "white horse" does involve the choice of color. Yellow and black ones are all rejected owing to their color. White horses alone will do. That which does not exclude any color is not the same as that which excludes certain colors. Therefore it is said, a white horse is not a horse.

Things and Attributes

Chapter 3. Discourse on Things and Their Attributes

(Thesis): Things consist of nothing but their attributes. But are not attributes in and of themselves? Without attributes things cannot be said to be things. Without things, can there said to be attributes?

(Antithesis): Attributes are that which do not exist on earth; things are that which do exist on earth. It would be improper to take what does exist as what does not exist.

(Thesis): Indeed there are no attributes on earth, and things may not be said to be just attributes. Although things may not be said to be attributes, however, are they not that to which attributes are attributed? Attributes are not attributes in and of themselves, but things consist of nothing but their attributes. Again, there are no attributes on earth. Although things may not be said to be just attributes, certainly neither do they consist of anything other than attributes. Since they do not consist of anything other than attributes, things consist of nothing but attributes. Things consist of nothing but their attributes, but attributes are not attributes in and of themselves.

(Antithesis): That there are no attributes on earth is due to the fact that things have their respective names and are not just attributes. To call them attributes when they are not is to claim all are attributes. It would be improper to take what are not all attributes as what are nothing but attributes.

(Thesis): To be sure, attributes are that which does not exist on earth. Although there are no attributes on earth, things may not be said to be without attributes. Since they may not be said to be without attributes, things do not consist of anything other than their attributes. Since they do not consist of anything other than their attributes, things consist of nothing but their attributes. Not that attributes are not attributes. But attributes in things are not attributes in and of themselves. Were there no attributes-in things on earth, who could say simply there are no attributes? Were there attributes but no attributes-in-things, who could say simply there are no attributes or simply that things consist of nothing but their attributes? Furthermore, attributes are indeed not attributes in and of themselves. And it is only because they adhere to things that they become attributes.

Hardness and Whiteness

Chapter 5. Discourse on Hardness and Whiteness

Q. Hardness, whiteness, and stone— may one refer to them as three?

A. No.

Q. May one refer to them as two?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Hardness being not there, one perceives whiteness: thus what is represented is two (whiteness and stone). Similarly, whiteness not being there, one perceives hardness: thus what is represented is again two (hardness and stone).

Q. Having perceived whiteness one cannot say that whiteness is not there; having perceived hardness one cannot say that hardness is not there. Such being the nature of the existence of the stone, are there not three things?

A. When seeing, one does not perceive hardness but perceives whiteness. This is because hardness is not there. When touching, one does not perceive whiteness but perceives hardness. This is because whiteness is not there.

Q. If there were no whiteness on earth, one should not see a stone, and if there were no hardness on earth, one could not feel a stone. Hardness, whiteness, and the stone do not exclude one another. How could one of the three be hidden?

A. It hides itself, and is not hidden in or by anything else.

Q. Whiteness and hardness are indispensable qualities permeating each other in the stone. How is it possible for any of them to hide itself?

A. One perceives whiteness and one perceives hardness; what is seen and what is not seen are evidently separate. It is because the one (stone) and the two (qualities) do not permeate each other that they are separate. To be separate is to be in a position to hide.

Test of Reality

Q. The whiteness is the whiteness of the stone and the hardness is the hardness of the stone. Although one of them is visible while the other is not, the two together with the stone make three. They permeate one another as width and length do in the case of a surface. Why should they not be all represented together?

A. Something may be white, but whiteness is not thereby fixed upon it; something may be hard, but hardness is not thereby fixed upon it. What is not fixed upon anything is of universal application. How then is it possible to assume that hardness and whiteness must be in and of the stone?

Q. We touch the stone; unless it can be felt, there can be stone; unless there is the stone there is no sense in referring to the white stone. That the stone and its qualities are not separate is something that is necessary and infinitely so.

A. Stone is one; hardness and whiteness are two, though they are in the stone. But one of them can be felt while the other cannot; one of them can be seen while the other cannot. Obviously the tangible and intangible are separate; the visible and the invisible hide from each other. There being in hiding, who will say that they are not separate?

Judgment of Qualities

Q. Because the eye cannot behold hardness nor the hand grasp whiteness, one cannot urge that there is no hardness or whiteness. These organs function differently and cannot substitute for each other. But, just the same, hardness and whiteness both reside in the stone, and how can you insist that they are separate?

A. Hardness is hardness, not necessarily of the stone, as it can be of any other thing. Again, it is not necessarily hardness of any other thing; it can be hardness in and of itself. The hardness that is neither of the stone nor of any other thing does not seem to exist in the world—this is merely to say that it is hidden. If whiteness could not be whiteness in and of itself, how could it be whiteness of stone and things? If, on the other hand, whiteness is actually whiteness in and of itself, then it is whiteness without having to be whiteness of anything. With yellow and black colors it is the same. Then the stone itself is no more there, and what sense is there in referring to the hard and white stone? These are all separate, and they are separate from the nature of things. It is far better to accept the nature of things than to exert one's perceptive power of feeling and sight. Furthermore, whiteness is beheld by the eye, but the eye sees by means of light. However, light does not have the faculty of vision. Then neither light nor the eye can by itself see whiteness, and it must be the mind that sees it. Actually the mind alone cannot see it either. Thus the sight of whiteness must be something separate. Hardness is felt by the hand, but the hand feels by means of a hammer. However, the hammer does not have the faculty of feeling. Then neither the hammer nor the hand can feel hardness by itself, and it must be the mind that feels it. Actually the mind cannot feel it either. Thus the feeling of hardness is something separate. All existences in the world are separate; only when they are treated as independent is it correct.

Lewis Carroll might have delighted in the Chinese logicians. Perhaps he did know them. That would help explain Alice. Yet -as the White Horse discourse so eloquently proves-there is method and instruction in this madness. Chinese logic is a miniscule discipline but it exists-as does nearly everything else in the Middle Kingdom. Chinese philosophy as a whole also has a content of logic, implied and expressed. That will be made evident in the next article in this series. The subject will be what happened to Confucianism after Confucius, how its hold was fixed on the Chinese by Mencius.